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NEGLIGENT INVESTIGATION BY POLICE: CAN A DUTY OF 
CARE BE FOUND USING THE EXISTING NEGLIGENCE 
PRINCIPLES IN AUSTRALIA? 
JENNIFER YULE∗ 
I INTRODUCTION 
There is a struggle in the courts to find a balance between allowing public authorities to 
function properly and protecting the public from a failure by public authorities to exercise 
their power appropriately. In October 2007, the Supreme Court of Canada controversially 
brought down its decision in Hill v Hamilton-Wentworth Regional Police Services Board 
(‘Hill’).1 The facts involved a man being wrongly convicted of a crime, suing the police, 
being successful in terms of the court finding a duty of care owed to him, but ultimately 
receiving no compensation. The tort of negligent investigation was first recognised in the 
Canadian province of Ontario in 1995 in Beckstead v Corporation of the City of Ottawa 
Chief of Police2 and was affirmed by the Ontario Court of Appeal in 1997.3 Some other 
provinces in Canada have recognised the tort, such as Quebec,4 while other jurisdictions 
in Canada have rejected the tort, for example, Alberta.5 The tort had not been considered 
by the Supreme Court until Hill.6 The decision in the Supreme Court overrules the lower 
court decisions, and now the tort is recognised in all Canadian provinces. In Australia and 
the United Kingdom, the courts do not refer to a tort of negligent investigation but rather 
consider whether there is a duty of care within the existing tort of negligence. In the 
United Kingdom, the tort has been rejected by the House of Lords.7 The tort has been 
rejected by lower courts in Australia8 and New Zealand.9 Therefore it is still open for the 
higher courts in Australia and New Zealand to decide whether or not to follow the 
approach of the House of Lords or the Canadian Supreme Court. The focus of this paper 
will be on the relationship between the police and the accused. This paper will consider 
the Canadian case and decision, and whether an Australian court would find for the 
plaintiff in similar circumstances. This is important when considering the powers that 
police are given as well as the function of the law of torts. 
II CANADIAN CASE OF HILL 
A Facts 
                                                 
∗ Associate Lecturer, School of Law, Queensland University of Technology. 
1 [2007] SCC 41. 
2 Beckstead v Corporation of the City of Ottawa Chief of Police (1995) 37 OR (3d) 64 (gen Div). 
3 Beckstead v Corporation of the City of Ottawa Chief of Police (1997) 37 OR (3d) 62 (CA). 
4 Jauvin v Quebec (Attorney General) [2004] RRA 37. 
5 Dix v Canada (Attorney General) [2003] 1 WWR 436. 
6 [2007] SCC 41. 
7 Brooks v Commissioner of Police for the Metropolis [2005] UKHL 24. 
8 Duke v State of New South Wales [2005] NSWSC 632. 
9 Gregory v Gollan [2006] NZHC 426. 
2 
 
Between December 1994 and January 1995, there were 10 robberies of trust companies, 
credit unions and banks in Hamilton, Ontario. After the seventh robbery, Jason Hill, an 
Ontario man, became a suspect after the police had received a tip from the public. There 
were a number of issues, during the police investigation, with the conduct of a line-up, 
the interviewing of witnesses, and the failure to reinvestigate when there was new 
evidence. The other participants in the line-up, which included Hill, who was a young 
Aboriginal man, were 11 Caucasian foils.10 In the 10th robbery, the two tellers had 
enlarged photos of Hill, which had been released by police, on their desks. The two bank 
tellers were interviewed by police together. Despite receiving a tip that Hill was not the 
robber, but rather two Hispanic men,11 Hill was arrested by police in 1995 and spent 20 
months in jail. He was charged with 10 counts of robbery; however, nine of the charges 
were gradually dropped. The police proceeded with the charge for the 10th robbery and 
Hill was found guilty and sentenced to three years in prison. Hill appealed against his 
conviction, which was allowed, and a new trial was ordered at which he was acquitted of 
the robbery charge. 
Hill began civil proceedings against the Hamilton-Wentworth Police Services Board and 
individual police officers, claiming malicious prosecution, negligence and breach of his 
rights under the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.12 At trial, the judge found 
that Hill had been wrongly convicted but that his rights had not been violated, nor was 
any tort committed.13 Hill appealed this judgment, which was dismissed by the Ontario 
Court of Appeal.14 The Court of Appeal was unanimous in its support of the tort of 
negligent investigation but was divided on its application. Three judges held that the 
standard of care was not breached15 while two judges found the police conduct did 
amount to a breach of the tort of negligent investigation.16 Hill appealed to the Supreme 
Court of Canada17 and the respondents cross-appealed.18  
B Reasons of the Majority  
                                                 
10 Hill v Hamilton-Wentworth Regional Police Services Board [2007] SCC 41 [6]. 
11 Ibid [7]. 
12 Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part 1 of the Constitution Act 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 
1982 (UK) c 11. 
13 Hill v Hamilton-Wentworth Regional Police Services Board (2003) 66 OR (3d) 746. 
14The judges found that the trial judge’s conclusions were not unreasonable or insufficient and that the 
police officers had not acted maliciously or for an improper purpose: see Hill v Hamilton-Wentworth 
Regional Police Services Board (2005) 76 OR (3d) 481. 
15 Ibid [112] (MacPherson JA, with MacFarland and Goudge JJA concurring). 
16 Ibid [156] (Feldman and LaForme JJA). 
17 The appellant appealed the finding that the police were not negligent and did not pursue the claim under 
the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. Hill alleged that the police investigation was negligent, first 
because the identifications by the two bank tellers were not conducted according to non-mandatory 
guidelines that they be interviewed separately and they had newspaper photos of Hill on their desks 
identifying him as the suspect. Second, Hill objected to the administration of the photo line-up. Third, Hill 
alleged that the police failed to adequately reinvestigate the robberies when new evidence emerged to cast 
doubt on his initial arrest. 
18 The respondents cross-appealed the finding that there was a tort of negligent investigation. 
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In Hill, the majority of the Supreme Court were very clear about the existence of the tort 
of negligent investigation.19 As McLachlin CJ stated at the beginning of the judgment, 
delivered on behalf of the majority with Binnie, LeBel, Deschamps, Fish and Abella JJ: 
I conclude that the police are not immune from liability under the 
Canadian law of negligence, that the police owe a duty of care in 
negligence to suspects being investigated, and their conduct during the 
course of investigation should be measured against the standard of how a 
reasonable officer in like circumstances would have acted. The tort of 
negligent investigation exists in Canada, and the trial court and Court of 
Appeal were correct to consider the appellant’s action on this basis. The 
law of negligence does not demand a perfect investigation. It requires 
only that police conducting an investigation act reasonably. When police 
fail to meet the standard of reasonableness, they may be accountable 
through negligence law for harm resulting to a suspect.20  
In Canada, the Anns v Merton London Borough Council (‘Anns’)21 approach is used to 
determine whether a duty of care is owed by a defendant to a plaintiff. In Anns22 the 
council was sued for failing to inspect foundations. Lord Wilberforce stated the test as 
involving two stages. The first is to ask if there is a sufficient relationship of proximity 
between the parties. If the answer to that question is ‘yes’, then it is necessary to consider 
whether there is any reason to negate that duty.23 Since 2001, the approach in Canada has 
involved a three-stage process involving the reasonable foreseeability of the injury, the 
relationship of proximity and any residual policy considerations which ought to negate or 
limit the duty of care.24 The policy considerations are ‘not concerned with the 
relationship between the parties but with the effect of recognising a duty of care on other 
legal obligations, the legal system and society more generally’.25 
The Court stressed that this case, in Hill, only involved the relationship between the 
police and a suspect. Other relationships, such as victims and police and the families of 
victims, should be subjected to a fresh Anns26 approach.27 Here, the Court found that the 
relationship between Hill and the police was personal, close and direct. He was not in a 
                                                 
19 Until this judgment, the question of whether there was a duty of care owed to a suspect by an 
investigating police officer was not settled in Canadian law. 
20 Hill v Hamilton-Wentworth Regional Police Services Board [2007] SCC 41, [3]. 
21 Anns v Merton London Borough Council [1978] AC 728. 
22 Ibid. 
23 Ibid 751, where Lord Wilberforce stated: ‘In order to establish that a duty of care arises in a particular 
situation, it is not necessary to bring the facts of that situation within those of previous situations in which a 
duty of care has been held to exist. Rather the question has to be approached in two stages. First, one has to 
ask whether, as between the alleged wrongdoer and the person who has suffered damage there is a 
sufficient relationship of proximity or neighbourhood such that, in the reasonable contemplation of the 
former, carelessness on his part may be likely to cause damage to the latter — in which case a prima facie 
duty of care arises. Secondly, if the first question is answered affirmatively, it is necessary to consider 
whether there are any considerations which ought to negative, or to reduce or limit the scope of the duty or 
the class of person to whom it is owed or the damages to which a breach of it may give rise.’ 
24 Jason W Neyers and Una Gabie, ‘Canadian Tort Law Since Cooper v Hobart: Part 1’ (2005) 13 Tort Law 
Journal 302. 
25 Cooper v Hobart [2001] 3 SCR 537, [37]. 
26 Anns v Merton London Borough Council [1978] AC 728, 751. 
27 Hill v Hamilton-Wentworth Regional Police Services Board [2007] SCC 41, [27].  
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pool of potential suspects but had been singled out and identified as a particularised 
suspect at the relevant time.28 There was also Hill’s personal interest in the conduct of the 
investigation, being his freedom and reputation, as well as the public interest: 
Recognizing an action for negligent police investigation may assist in 
responding to failures of the justice system, such as wrongful convictions 
or institutional racism. The unfortunate reality is that negligent policing 
has now been recognized as a significant contributing factor to wrongful 
convictions in Canada. While the vast majority of police officers perform 
their duties carefully and reasonably, the record shows that wrongful 
convictions traceable to faulty police investigations occur. Even one 
wrongful conviction is too many, and Canada has more than one. Police 
conduct that is not malicious, not deliberate, but merely fails to comply 
with standards of reasonableness can be a significant cause of wrongful 
convictions.29  
The Court concluded that an investigating police officer does owe a duty of care to a 
particular suspect30 and rejected the argument that recognition of the duty of care would 
create a conflict between the duty owed by the police officer to the suspect and the police 
officer’s duty to the public.31 
The Court found that there was no compelling policy reason why a duty of care should 
not be found in the circumstances. In fact, the Court found there were policy reasons 
supporting the finding of a duty of care.32 The Court considered the policy reasons raised 
by the respondents, namely: the ‘quasi-judicial’ nature of police duties; the potential for 
conflict between the duty of care and other duties owed by the police; the amount of 
discretion needed in police work; the negative effect on the investigation of crime; and 
the floodgates argument.33 The Court stated that such policy considerations need to be 
more than speculative and ‘a real potential for negative consequences must be 
apparent’.34 It was found that according to such a standard, ‘none of these considerations 
provide a convincing reason for rejecting a duty of care’.35 With regard to the negative 
impact on policing, the Court said: 
In theory, it is conceivable that police might become more careful in 
conducting investigations if a duty of care in tort is recognized. However, 
this is not necessarily a bad thing. The police officer must strike a 
reasonable balance between cautiousness and prudence on the one hand, 
and efficiency on the other.36 
                                                 
28 Ibid [33]. 
29 Ibid [36]. 
30 Ibid [39]. 
31 Ibid [40]. 
32 Ibid [47]. 
33 Ibid [48]. 
34 Ibid. 
35 Ibid. 
36 Ibid [56]. 
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The Court found that there was a lack of evidence of the negative effect on policing37 and 
noted that: 
Many police officers (like other professionals) are indemnified from 
personal civil liability in the course of exercising their professional 
duties, reducing the prospect that their fear of civil liability will chill 
crime prevention.38 
On the issue of opening the floodgates, the Court found that the requirement of sufficient 
proximity between the investigating police officer and the suspect, as well as the element 
of compensable injury, ensured that there would not be indeterminate liability.39 The 
Court considered the experience of the provinces of Ontario and Quebec, where the tort 
has been recognised for some years, and found that there was no evidence that the 
floodgates had opened.40 
The best that can be said from the record is that recognizing a duty of 
care owed by police officers to particular suspects led to a relatively 
small number of lawsuits, the cost of which are unknown, with effects on 
the police that have not been measured. This is not enough to negate the 
prima facie duty of care established at the first stage of the Anns test.41 
Having found that a duty of care was owed, the Court then considered what the standard 
of care was and whether it had been breached. It held that the standard was that of a 
reasonable police officer in all the circumstances and that the standard had not been 
breached in the current case, even though there were faults in the investigation.42 These 
faults included the conduct of the investigation during 1995,43 the conduct of the photo 
line-up44 and the lack of reinvestigation when new information emerged.45 The Court 
applied the standard of a reasonable police officer at the time, which ‘allows for minor 
mistakes and misjudgements.’46 
The Court found that for the final element, damage, the plaintiff must show a suffering of 
compensable damage and a causal connection to a breach of the standard of care owed: 
It is important as a matter of policy that recovery under the tort of 
negligent investigation should only be allowed for pains and penalties 
that are wrongfully imposed. The police must be allowed to investigate 
and apprehend suspects and should not be penalized for doing so under 
the tort of negligent investigation unless the treatment imposed on a 
suspect results from a negligent investigation and causes compensable 
                                                 
37 Ibid [58]. 
38 Ibid [59]. 
39 Ibid [60]. 
40 Ibid [61]. 
41 Ibid [61]. 
42 Ibid [89]. 
43 Ibid [77]. 
44 Ibid [81]. 
45 Ibid [84]. 
46 Ibid [77]. 
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damage that would not have occurred but for the police’s negligent 
conduct.47 
The Court concluded that while a duty of care was owed to the plaintiff, it had not been 
breached. There were mistakes made in the investigation, but not enough to amount to a 
breach. The Court found that the standard at the time in 1995 was not as high as it would 
be if today’s standards were being applied, particularly with the racial make-up of the 
police line-up. It was held that the police conduct was not unreasonable, especially since, 
at the time, there were no guidelines or rules about how to conduct the line-up.48 With 
regard the decision not to reinvestigate, the Court held that even though the decision was 
flawed, ‘it has not been established that Detective Loft breached the standard of a 
reasonable police officer similarly placed’.49 
C Reasons of the Minority 
Charron J, with Bartarache and Rothstein JJ, delivered the judgment on behalf of the 
dissenting judges on the cross-appeal. The minority decision found that there should not 
be a tort of negligent investigation in Canada. 
A private duty of care owed by the police to suspects would necessarily 
conflict with the investigating officer’s overarching public duty to 
investigate crime and apprehend offenders. The ramifications from this 
factor alone defeat the claim that there is a relationship of proximity 
between the parties sufficient to give rise to a prima facie duty of care. In 
addition, because the recognition of this new tort would detrimentally 
affect the legal system, and society more generally, it is my view that 
even if a prima facie duty of care were found to exist, that duty should be 
negatived on residual policy grounds.50 
With regard to whether a duty of care is owed, Charron J considered the Anns51 test and 
searched for analogous categories in other jurisdictions such as the United Kingdom, 
New Zealand and Australia, where there are authorities which hold that no duty of care is 
owed by the police to suspects in a police investigation.52 Charron J concluded that there 
was a lack of proximity in the relationship between the investigating officer and the 
suspect.53  
Even if there was some proximity, the policy reasons, from the third stage of the process 
to determine whether there was a duty of care owed to the plaintiff, would preclude the 
finding of a duty of care.54 One of the policy reasons was the exercise of the police 
discretionary power and the fear that if a private duty of care was found to be owed, then 
                                                 
47 Ibid [92]. 
48 Ibid [80]. 
49 Ibid [89]. 
50 Ibid [112]. 
51 Anns v Merton London Borough Council [1978] AC 728. 
52 For example, Brooks v Commissioner of Police for the Metropolis [2005] UKHL 24; Duke v State of New 
South Wales [2005] NSWSC 632; and Gregory v Gollan [2006] NZHC 426. 
53 Hill v Hamilton-Wentworth Regional Police Services Board [2007] SCC 41, [148]. 
54 Ibid. 
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the exercise of this power may not be used to ‘advance the public interest as it should be, 
but out of fear of civil liability’.55 Another policy reason was that the tort would not be 
limited to plaintiffs who had been wrongly convicted, but also applied to plaintiffs where 
the investigation is terminated at an earlier point.56 Charron J also pointed out the 
differences between civil actions and criminal trials, in particular, the different burdens of 
proof and the rules of evidence and procedure. Charron J stated: 
On the one hand, there is no question that negligent police investigation 
may contribute to the wrongful conviction of a person who did not 
commit the crime … On the other hand, a negligent investigation will 
often be the effective cause of an acquittal … Numerous evidentiary and 
procedural safeguards are built in the criminal trial process to guard 
against wrongful convictions.57  
These policy concerns about the difference between the public and the private areas of 
the law were not resolved, according to Charron J, by defining the standard of care.58 
Taking all these concerns into consideration: 
The private nature of the tort action necessarily narrows the focus of the 
criminal investigation to the individual rights of the parties and, in the 
process, it is almost inevitable that courts lose sight of the broader public 
interests at stake. In short, tort law simply does not fit.59 
Charron J found that the existing torts of false arrest, false imprisonment, malicious 
prosecution and misfeasance in public office are sufficient to deal with negligent police 
practice and that these torts do not give rise to policy concerns.60 Charron J concluded by 
considering the government inquiries and studies into police practice and stated that 
‘compensation for the wrongfully convicted is a matter better left for the legislators in the 
context of a comprehensive statutory scheme’ rather than ‘left to the vagaries of the 
proposed tort action.’61 
D Summary 
There was a conflict in the judgments between the private versus public nature of the 
duty and the policy reasons involved. While the minority found there was a lack of 
proximity in the relationship between the police and the suspect, the majority found that 
the proximity was enough for the floodgates not to open. The minority found it was not 
necessary to find a new tort as existing torts were sufficient, whereas the majority found a 
new tort was necessary. The policy reasons the minority relied on were found to be no 
more than speculative by the majority. The police discretion, which the minority found 
meant there should not be a duty of care, was a reason the majority found there was a 
                                                 
55 Ibid [149]. 
56 Ibid [154]. 
57 Ibid [160]. 
58 Ibid [169]. 
59 Ibid [180]. 
60 Ibid [181]. 
61 Ibid [187]. 
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duty of care owed. Both referred to other jurisdictions such as the United Kingdom and 
Australia. 
There have been a number of articles written on this case since the decision was handed 
down only 12 months ago. Erika Chamberlain has described the majority judgment as 
naïve and the minority judgment as more realistic when considering the conflict of 
duties.62 However, Chamberlain points out that the Court was sympathetic to police 
intuition and was ‘unwilling to second guess the exercise of discretion’.63 Jennifer Freund 
expressed concern that the decision ‘seems to be a simplistic view of the complex nature 
of policing’.64 Whereas Rakhi Ruparelia has found it ‘disturbing’ that there was a 
minority judgment at all and that the standard used meant that there was an ‘impossibly 
high standard for plaintiffs to prove police negligence’.65 Ruparelia argues that the 
change is ‘more symbolic than real’.66 
III APPROACH IN THE UNITED KINGDOM 
It is also relevant to consider what is happening in the United Kingdom in this area. The 
current English approach as to whether a duty of care is owed is to use the three stages 
from Caparo Industries v Dickman.67 The House of Lords has taken a very conservative 
approach when dealing with the issue of police and their duties with regards to their 
investigations compared with the Canadian Supreme Court. In Hill v Chief Constable of 
West Yorkshire,68 the House of Lords held that police officers did not owe a duty to 
individual members of the public who might suffer injury through their careless failure to 
apprehend a dangerous criminal. Lord Keith of Kinkel pointed out that the conduct of a 
police investigation involves a variety of decisions on matters of policy and discretion, 
including decisions as to priorities in the deployment of resources. To subject those 
decisions to a common law duty of care, and to the kind of judicial scrutiny involved in 
an action in tort, was held to be inappropriate.69 
In Brooks v Commissioner of Police for the Metropolis & Ors,70 the House of Lords 
upheld Hill v Chief Constable of West Yorkshire.71 However, Lord Steyn reformulated the 
principle in terms of an absence of a duty of care rather than a blanket immunity.72  
                                                 
62 Erika Chamberlain, ‘Negligent Investigation: The End of Malicious Prosecution in Canada’ (2008) 124 
Law Quarterly Review 205, 207. 
63 Ibid 206. 
64 Jennifer Freund, ‘Police Civil Liability for Negligent Investigation: An Analysis of the Supreme Court of 
Canada Decision in Hill v Hamilton-Wentworth Regional Police Services Board’ (2008) 53 Criminal Law 
Quarterly 469, 485. 
65 Rakhi Ruparelia, ‘“Denying Justice”: Does the Tort of Negligent Investigation Go Far Enough?’ (2008) 
16 Tort Law Review 48. 
66 Ibid. 
67 [1990] 2 AC 605 (Lord Bridge of Harwich). 
68 [1989] AC 53. 
69 Sullivan v Moody (2001) 207 CLR 562, 581. 
70 [2005] UKHL 24. 
71 [1989] AC 53. 
72 Brooks v Commissioner of Police for the Metropolis & Ors [2005] UKHL, [27]. 
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It is, of course, desirable that police officers should treat victims and 
witnesses properly … But to convert that ethical value into general legal 
duties of care … would be going too far. The prime function of the police 
is the preservation of the Queen’s peace … A retreat from the principle 
in Hill would have detrimental effects for law enforcement.73 
IV APPROACH IN AUSTRALIA 
A Existing Negligence Principles 
The current approach in Australia as to whether a duty of care is owed is to be found in 
Sullivan v Moody74 where the High Court considered whether a duty of care was owed by 
a public authority to parents for the negligent investigation of child sexual abuse. The 
Court held: 
There are cases, and this is one, where to find a duty of care would so cut 
across other legal principles as to impair their proper application and thus 
lead to the conclusion that there is no duty of care of the kind asserted.75 
The Court stated that ‘[a] duty of the kind alleged should not be found if that duty would 
not be compatible with other duties the respondents owed.’76 The Court also considered 
with approval the English authorities and concluded: 
But if a suggested duty of care would give rise to inconsistent 
obligations, that would ordinarily be a reason for denying that the duty 
exists. Similarly, when public authorities, or their officers, are charged 
with the responsibility of conducting investigations, or exercising 
powers, in the public interest, or in the interests of a specified class of 
persons, the law would not ordinarily subject them to a duty to have 
regards to the interests of another class of persons where that would 
impose upon them conflicting claims or obligations.77  
Tame v New South Wales; Annetts v Australian Stations Pty Limited (‘Tame’)78 applied 
the principles from Sullivan v Moody. The facts of Tame involved a police officer 
incorrectly recording the blood alcohol content of the plaintiff on the accident report. 
When the plaintiff was later told of this mistake, which had already been rectified, the 
plaintiff suffered psychiatric injury. Gleeson CJ found no duty of care was owed because 
the primary duty of the police officer in making the accident report was to his or her 
superiors. Therefore, to find a duty of care to the person being investigated would be 
inconsistent with that primary duty.79 Gummow and Kirby JJ found that: 
It is unlikely that an investigating police officer owes a duty of care to a 
person whose conduct is under investigation. Such a duty would appear 
                                                 
73 Ibid [30]. 
74 (2001) 207 CLR 562. 
75 Ibid 580. 
76 Ibid 581. 
77 Ibid 582. 
78 (2002) 211 CLR 317. 
79 Ibid 333. 
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to be inconsistent with the police officer’s duty … fully to investigate the 
conduct in question80 
Hayne J stated that:  
Police officers investigating possible contravention of the law do not owe 
a common law duty to take reasonable care to prevent psychiatric injury 
to those whose conduct they are investigating. Their duties lie elsewhere 
and to find a duty of care to those whom they investigate would conflict 
with those other duties.81 
The current Australian approach, when faced with a novel category, is to go to general 
principle82 and refer to analogous cases.83 Factors such as responsibility and relationship, 
vulnerability, control, reliance, other areas of law and coherence of the law are all 
relevant considerations.  
B Australian Cases Involving Police Investigation 
There have been a number of cases recently which have considered whether police owe a 
duty of care in their investigations and considered the English authorities. Some cases 
have involved the relationship between the police and the accused and others with the 
victims of crime. This paper is limiting its focus to the former but it should be explained 
that in Australia, Hill v Chief Constable of West Yorkshire84 was distinguished in 
Batchelor v Tasmania85 on the basis that there was a police policy to arrest a person in 
such circumstances as were present in that case. The circumstances in that case involved 
a wife being shot by her husband after she had gone to the police to seek assistance. It 
was alleged that the police officers were negligent in failing to arrest the husband, in 
informing him of their plans to go the house, and in not evacuating the house when it was 
noticed that one of the husband’s firearms was missing.86  
It is also relevant to consider Cran v State of New South Wales (‘Cran’)87 for fears about 
defensive policing.88 In that case, the police failed to get a certificate of analysis by the 
next court date and the plaintiff ended up spending 62 days in jail. The New South Wales 
Court of Appeal found that there was no duty of care owed to the plaintiff for the 
investigation of the case and that policy considerations were paramount.89 The Court 
considered the dependence of the plaintiff on the defendant, the vulnerability of the 
                                                 
80 Ibid 396. 
81 Ibid 418. 
82 Carolyn Sappideen, Prue Vines, Helen Grant and Penelope Watson, Torts Commentary and Materials 
(9th ed, 2006) 208. 
83 Frances McGlone and Amanda Stickley, Australian Torts Law (2005) 125. 
84 [1989] AC 53. 
85 [2005] TASSC 11. 
86 Ibid [4]. 
87 (2004) 62 NSWLR 95. 
88 Harold Luntz and David Hambly, Torts Cases and Commentary (5th revised ed, 2006) 207. 
89 Cran v State of New South Wales [2004] NSWCA 92, [77]. 
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plaintiff, the nature of the function being performed, the relevant police guidelines and, 
by analogy, other cases.90 However, Santow JA stated: 
While it may be said that calling police to account for failure to perform 
ministerial tasks actually enhances the performance of their duty, I do not 
consider that that resolves the fundamental difficulty. It is that by 
subjecting by way of exception mechanical tasks to a duty of care, courts 
are thereby affecting police priorities in the allocation of resources. 
Subjecting even ministerial tasks to prospective civil liability thus has 
policy implications.91 
Another example was in November 2007 when a university student in Queensland was 
unsuccessful in an action against the police and the government in negligence and false 
imprisonment.92 Justice Lyons found there had been no negligence in the arrest and 
imprisonment and that it was not necessary to ‘precisely examine the nature and extent of 
the duty of care owed to the plaintiff’.93 It should be noted that the case was primarily 
decided on the issue of false imprisonment. 
Since the decision of Hill, there have been some decisions in Australia involving police 
and whether they owe a duty of care or not. State of New South Wales v Tyszyk94 was held 
not to involve investigation by police but rather with the discretion exercised by the 
police to deal with a fallen tree and a drainpipe. The Court of Appeal held that the police 
did not owe a duty of care to the plaintiff because he was not in a more vulnerable 
position than other members of the public and there was nothing in the relationship that 
was different from the rest of the public. Kirkland-Veenstra v Stuart95 was also held to 
not involve investigation by police but, rather, the failure to exercise a statutory power. 
The Court of Appeal held that no duty of care was owed by the police. This case has gone 
on appeal to the High Court. In Cumming v State of NSW,96 Harrison AsJ held that the 
police did not owe a duty of care to the family of a person reported as a missing person. It 
was held that there are four main reasons for courts to decide that there is no duty of care 
when considering circumstances involving police investigation. The first is that it would 
impose a duty to an indeterminate class of people. The second is that it would inhibit 
fearless investigation of criminal activity. Third, there may be a conflict of duties. The 
final reason is it would involve the court intruding on matters of police policy and 
discretion, including decisions made as to priorities in the deployment of resources.97 
C Summary of Position in Australia 
It would seem, from a consideration of the Australian cases involving police 
investigation, that the courts are not prepared to find a duty of care owed. This is so even 
                                                 
90 Ibid [31]. 
91 Ibid [51]. 
92 Mark Oberhardt, ‘Kill Suspect Fails to Win Damages’, The Courier Mail (Brisbane), 1 November 2007. 
93 Ferguson v State of Queensland [2007] QSC 322, [134]. 
94 [2008] NSWCA 107. 
95 [2008] VSCA 32. 
96 [2008] NSWSC 690. 
97 Ibid [66]. 
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though there may be factors such as closeness in the relationship between the parties, 
control and vulnerability. The overarching consideration seems to be a concern about the 
coherence of the law and conflicts with other duties and policies.  
However, the courts have not ‘unreservedly committed to the public policy immunity 
prevailing in England’98 and have, therefore, left open the door to an ‘exceptionally 
egregious situation where courts could find liability for negligent investigation’.99 There 
is some consideration of the powers that police are given as well as the function of the 
law of torts. A duty of care would only be found if all the relevant factors were present. If 
there was a case where there was a sufficient relationship between the parties, 
vulnerability of the plaintiff was high, control of the defendant was high, there was 
coherence in the law and no interference with existing laws, and there were guidelines in 
place that had not been complied with, then a duty of care could be found to exist. The 
facts in Cran100 appear to fit that scenario but the Court of Appeal was not prepared to 
find such a duty. It would seem that it will take the High Court to find such a duty. 
V CONCLUSION 
The decision by the majority of the Canadian Supreme Court in Hill101 has been criticised 
by some commentators on the basis that finding a duty of care owed by an investigating 
police officer to a particularised suspect will hamper police and will produce defensive 
policing. However, it can be argued that it is actually a good result for the public. It has 
the potential to protect individuals and set standards. There is an argument that the police 
need to be accountable, like other groups in the community who provide services and 
have responsibilities. There needs to be a balance between the rights of a person’s 
liberties with the right of the police to do their job and, ultimately, to protect the public. 
This decision should be put in context. Canada has had a number of cases involving 
negligent investigation and, therefore, it is an issue very much in the public 
consciousness at the present.102 There were a number of wrongful convictions and Royal 
Commissions dealing with the ‘systemic racism in the criminal justice system’.103 This 
situation should be contrasted with other jurisdictions which may have other issues more 
in the public domain, for example, police corruption. 
Should this decision have any repercussions in Australia? While this case demonstrates 
that the police should have nothing to fear from the tort, it is more likely that Australia 
would follow the House of Lords rather than the Supreme Court of Canada. However, it 
is important to remember that people do suffer damage as a result of poor, or arguably 
negligent, investigation by the police. Cran104 is an example of the damage that can result 
from negligent investigation. Police are given many powers and the public expects them 
                                                 
98 Rush v Commissioner of Police [2006] FCA 12, [99]. 
99 Freund, above n 63, 470. 
100 (2004) 62 NSWLR 95. 
101 Hill v Hamilton-Wentworth Regional Police Services Board [2007] SCC 41. 
102 Chamberlain, above n 61, 208. 
103 Ruparelia, above n 64, 52. 
104 (2004) 62 NSWLR 95. 
13 
 
to be accountable. Why should they not be liable, as other groups such as doctors, 
lawyers and engineers are? With regards to the argument about the burden on the 
individual, police can be insured, similarly to other groups owing a duty of care. Also, the 
application of vicarious liability will shift the burden to the employers who are also in the 
position of being able to make changes to existing practices in order to improve 
guidelines and methods used in the investigation process.105 
One of the ideas underpinning torts and the law of negligence is the loss-spreading 
function and compensating someone when they have suffered damage.106 Of course, if 
everyone who suffered damage was compensated, the floodgates would certainly open.107 
However, as long as there is a sufficiently close relationship between the investigating 
police officer and the suspect, that fear can be dealt with. Therefore, if, as the majority 
concluded in Hill,108 the suspect must be singled out and particularised, the potential 
number of plaintiffs will be limited. If proper limits are clearly established, the potential 
for unlimited liability can be confined.  
There is also the argument that one of the functions of torts is the incentive effect and that 
this will hamper the public duty performed by police officers and make their difficult 
work more difficult rather than improve the standard of their work.109 However, there has 
not been an economic analysis of the effect of taking precautions, so this argument is 
merely an assertion.110 From a public policy perspective, it would seem arguable that the 
precautions would be a burden that the public would be willing and prepared to bear. If 
police are compared to health professionals, it would seem that ‘as long as the courts 
maintain a deferential stance in terms of the standard of care, there is no reason for police 
to fear that their discretion will be constantly second-guessed’.111 
The case of Hill112 illustrates that finding a duty of care owed by investigating police to 
suspects does not automatically lead to compensation being paid. It is not a tort of strict 
liability. Rather, there must be a breach of the duty of care for liability to arise. The 
standard of care is what is reasonable to expect in the circumstances. Why should 
jurisdictions in Australia, New Zealand and the United Kingdom not protect suspects 
from negligent investigation? Police have nothing to fear from such a standard and the 
public is justified in expecting such a standard to be complied with. However, if a fact 
scenario similar to Hill113 came before an Australian court, it would seem from the result 
in Cran114 that the plaintiff would be unsuccessful. It would take the High Court to find 
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such a duty of care owed, using the existing negligence principles, and that would seem 
unlikely at present. 
